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I. INTRODUCTION
With some alarm I noticed when working on this talk that I had
used exactly the same sub-title in a piece published in this country.
I N o tthat I expect this piece to be permanently on your bedside tables, but for
form's sake allow me to say that this present performance is markedly
different from that published one. That oversight does helpfully suggest
a new academic genre: a different paper with the same title rather than
the more usual academic variant of the same paper with different titles.
That latter thought is not entirely gratuitous, since my guiding
theme will revolve around things supposedly different being the same
and things supposedly the same being different. O f  course, the epochal
difference that must concern me here is that between the religious and
the secular. I t  is still the predominant view that the two are intrinsically
opposed. An  enlightened or modernist secularism comes to relegate re-
ligion definitively to realms of the private, the residual, and the atavistic!
Or religious belief is revealed as a projection of a definitive reality of this
t Anniversary Professor of Law, Birlcbeck, University of London. This paper is a revised version of
the keynote address offered to the Symposium Pluralism, Religion & the Law held at the Seattle
University School of Law on March 7, 2008. M y  thanks to many of the symposiasts for invaluable
comments; to Russell Powell for  the generous invitation to give the talk; to Tayyab Mahmud for
unsurpassed hospitality; and to Maria Carolina Olarte Olarte and Richard Joyce for crucial refer-
ences and translations.
I. Peter Fitzpatrick, The Triumph of a Departed World: Law, Modernity, and the Sacred, in
LAW AND THE SACRED (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2007).
The ti tle proper "Legal  Theology" deliberately resonates w i th CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON ME CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY, (George Schwab trans., The Univ.
of Chicago Press 2005) (1922), especially chapter 3. I f  anyone were so inclined, this present paper
can be read as a response to the two linked failures of POLITICAL THEOLOGY. One failure is the
difficulty involved in creating something, the sovereign, in terms of what it creates, the decision on
the exception. The other difficulty is Schmitt's inability to resolve the conundrum of the sovereign's
generating a legal order that somehow exists and persists apart from the sovereign.
2. E.g., MARCEL GAUCHET, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
RELIGION (Oscar Burge trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (1985).
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world.
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making out a revisionist, even a revanchist case. Often, but not always,
prompted by the exaggerated perception o f  a religious revival, these
tomes find that the very secular quality of modern political formation, or
some variety of it, is derived from and sustained by the religious.
4 T h i s ,to be a little more specific, is an occidental modernity and the religion
invoked is Christianity. There is, however, an obvious problem here. I f
the religious and the secular are the same, what is to stop their fusing
indistinguishably with each other? There seems to be (also) some differ-
ence to be observed. The revisionist premise itself confirms difference
for it is set against the continued affirmation of a divide between the se-
cular and the religious, even if  it can find that divide to be phantasmal.
I will later have some regard for the phantasm, but for now allow
me to indicate more pointedly what this talk will be about. The argument
overall will be that with the supposedly modem Occident there is both
sameness and difference as between the secular and the religious, and
that law, modem law, is constituently enmeshed within this sameness
nd difference. That combination of sameness and difference, along with
the integral part of law, is traced in a cumulation of three historicities, the
first being the creation of the world's imperium, of the modem world-
system, in the sixteenth century. Then, with the second historicity we
have the time of revolutions, seen here as almost revolutions, of the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. And finally, with the third historicity
we have the time of high modernism and the death of God in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. Each of these three phases is captured, as
it were, in the work of a corresponding thinker who is taken to be a tell-
ing instance: Vitoria, Hobbes, Nietzsche. A l l  o f  that is then briefly
brought into what could precariously be called the present and in a way
that reveals the exercise to have been all along a history of the present.
Before embarking on that modest agenda, allow me to say some-
thing about the "history" drawn on here, this history of the present. The
3. K g . ,  LUDW I G  FEUEFtBACH, T HE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY (G eorge E l io t  t rans. ,  P r om e-
theus Books 1989) (184I); SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO ch. 4 (James Strachey trans., Lon-
don, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1960) (1913). Much of the orientation of this present paper is cap-
tured in Manes apercm "We do not turn secular questions into theological questions, we turn theo-
logical questions into secular questions." KAR L MARX, On the Jewish Question, i n EARLY
WRITINGS 211,217 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Penguin Books 1992) (1843).
4. For an engaging and influential instance, see JOHN GRAY, BLACK MASS: APOCALYPTIC
RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF UTOPIA (Allen Lane 2007). For  an empathic and formidable instance
see, CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2007). And for
something of the possible diversity of nuance, see Charles Barbour's paper in this Symposium Issue,
Separated Unto the Gospel of God: Political Theology in Badiou and Agamben, 32 SEATTLE U. L.
REV.  279 (2009) ;  and also POLIT ICAL THEOLOGIES: PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN A P O S T
-
S E C U L A R  W O R L D
(Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan eds., Fordham Univ. Press 2006).
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phrase is associated with Foucault, and some of Foucault's meaning will
be brought in.
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be most sharply delineated by saying what it is not. I t  is not, to borrow
Foucault's account of Nietzschean history, "a history whose function is
to compose the finally reduced diversity of  time into a totality fully
closed upon itself."
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tal historiography of the progressivist's grand narrative. Such historiog-
raphy, in Rico ur's terms, "consists in elevating as an absolute this his-
torical present established as an observation point, even a tribunal, for all
the formations t h a t  have preceded it."
7 T h e  i n s t a n c e  
t h a t  
j u t s  
o u t  
i n
the present setting i  the tale of secularism's graded triumph over a di-
minishing force of the religious. In  stark contrast, the history of the pre-
sent resorted to here would seek to put the present in question, to reveal a
dissonance in it, and thence to account for that dissonance in affines of
the religious. That accounting cannot be a resolved completion within a
present that is always irresolvable. Rather, what it reveals, or attempts to
reveal, is a persistent incompletion in and as the present. Such revelation
involves, in turn, a bringing forth of what had to be forgotten so as to
affirm the putative completion that is, for example, the triumph of  a
modernist secularism. T his  is a forgetting that, in Nietzsche's terms
now, is an "active forgetfulness": "Forgetfulness is no mere vis inertiae
[force of inertia] as the superficial believe; it is rather an active—in the
strictest sense, positive—inhibiting capacity."
8 T h i s  f o r g e t t i n g  
i s  c o n -
tinuous with, and constituent of, what is remembered.
If, then, the purported effect, the realized culmination, of a grand
narrative cannot be claimed for this history of the present, what "force"
does it have? That force is one, borrowing the term from Keats, of  a
5. See Michael S. Roth, History of the Present, 20 HIST. & THEORY 32 (1981).
6. M I CHE L FOUCAULT ,  Niet zsche,  G enealogy ,  His t or y ,  i n  LANG UAG E,  C O U N T E R
-
M E M O R Y ,
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 139, 152 (Donald F. Bouchard &  Sherry Simon
trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1997) (1971).
7. PAUL RICOEUR, MEMORY,  HISTORY, FORGETTING 305 (Kat hleen B lar ney  &  Dav id  Pellauer
trans., The University of Chicago Press 2004) (2000).
8. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, O N THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 39 ( Douglas  Smit h t rans. ,  O x f or d
Univ. Press 1996) (1887) (Second Essay, § 1). Nietzsche is writing here of individual psychology,
but he proceeds to merge this dynamic into what could be called social or historical memory, fusing
that into an anthropology of law that we will come to later. For  Freud in a like vein, complete with
an apt  ref erence t o Niet zsche,  see SI G MUND FREUD, T HE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE
140, 152 n.5 (Anthea Bell trans., Penguin Books 2002) (1901). For forgetfulness in the constitution
of law, see Joan Dayan, Held in the Body of the State: Prisons and the Law, in HISTORY, MEMORY,
AND THE LAIN 183 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., The Univ. of Mich. Press 1999). And
for "collective" memory as "selected," see MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY (Lew-
is A. Coser trans., The Univ. of Chicago Press 1992) (1925).
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"negative capability."
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which I will engage had not been, then the present would not be as it is.
(Also, and here there will be a touch of narrative, it may be that each of
the three historicities could not have been without the one or the ones
coming before it.) A  present so derived cannot provide a carapace keep-
ing out other historical engagements with law and religion. Instead, and
like Keats's negative capability, this history of the present must remain
open and receptive.
II. IMPERIUM
My first ethos-bearing author is Francisco de Vitoria, whose teach-
ings provide an occidental template accommodating both modem impe-
rialism and modem political formation. And  whilst this template is a
religious one, it is one that Vitoria renders capable of taking effect, and
of taking on affect, in the world—if not, in its terms, entirely of  the
world. He does this, aptly enough, as an apologist for Spain's imperial
expansion into the Americas. With  this expansion, Spain provided the
enduring model of modem imperialism and, in conjunction with Portu-
gal, generated the operative ability to conceive of the world entire. Vito-
ria's contribution to the process was set against the more resolutely
genocidal of the Spanish colonists and, in his De Indis, he drew on Aqui-
nas and the lus gentium to find, broadly, that the Indians, so-called, were
human and possessed of reason and hence entitled to a commensurate
regard. This  did not prevent Vitoria's providing a refined justification
for their colonial subordination, however—a justification itself derived
from the lus gentium
m Vitoria projects that resolution onto a wider world in which the
tractable ius gentium, whilst extending to all people, is yet realised or
fully realised only by some, by a marginally flexible range of Christian
and civilized nations. Here, Vitoria adroitly adapted two types of ius
gentium in Roman law. One was the law common to, or shared by, all
civilized peoples. The other was the lus inter gentes, the law governing
relations between peoples and latterly international law. Vitor ia even
provided an apt accompanying lineament of nation, the "perfect commu-
nity" that is "complete in itself."
11 M o r e  o n  
t h a t  
s h o r t l y .9. Letter from John Keats to George and Thomas Keats on Keats's Negative Capability (Dec.21, 1817), available at http://www.mrbauld.cominegcap.html.
10. There is now a superb and readily available collection and translation of the works of Vito-
ria of particular relevance here, or of key extracts from them: FRANCISCO GE VITORIA, POLITICAL
WRITINGS (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., Jeremy Lawrence trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991).
VITORIA, On the Law of War, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 301.
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Before coming to the constitution of that national community, there
has to be a putting in place of an epochal shift marked by Vitoria, a shift
that provides the divine source of this constitution—provides what could
be called the hidden constitution: "[t]he real constitution," pronounced
Heraclitus, "is  accustomed to hide itself."
I2 T h e  b e s t o w i n g  
g o d  
h e r e
was, in Vitoria's Thomistic terms, a god who was the source of law, of
natural law or the law of nature: "[The rules of law are in God as in a
thing which is to rul ."
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infinitely more extensive than the constrained meaning that "law" often
came to take on later. Borrowing from Pagden and Lawrance: "For Vito-
ria, as for Aquinas, the law of nature was the efficient cause which un-
derpinned man's relationship with the world about him and governed
every practice within human society."
14 I t  w a s  
t h e n  
p o s s i b l e  
f r o m  
t h e
perspective of "man" to know the rules of  law that are in God as the
thing which is to rule. This was a god amenable to Vitoria's scholasti-
cism, the god of perfect order, of constancy, caught by "his" own laws,
by "nature," much like the god later forbidden by Malebranche to "dis-
turb the simplicity of his ways."
15 It has of course been an enduring issue with monotheism as to just
how this bound god, this god caught by "his" own creation, could endure
integrally with the perfectly unbound god of revelation, the god of mira-
cle and nature confounded, the god quite beyond us. With  Vitoria, as
with Thomist scholasticism, earthly natural law was derived from divine
law. And whilst divine law remained of the godhead and ever beyond
any comprehension or even manifestation, God's law for us had to be
made "externally manifest."
16 T h o m i s t  
d o c t r i n e  
a s c r i b
e d  
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c a u s
a l  
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c e
to divine law in it  effecting natural law: "God cannot destroy the effect
of the formal cause as long as the latter exists."
I7 O n e  c o u l d  
t h e n  
p r o j e c t
the effect that is natural law back on to divine law and thence to God
and, as it were, bind both divine law and the deity to that effect, to natu-
ral law. And so Vitoria would "think that God could not have made the
fire, which is hot by nature, cold, or that it were not warm by nature; nor
the snow black; the soil, light; nor could God destroy or change in gen-
12. G. S. KIRK, J. E. RAVEN, & M. SCHOFIELD, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS: A  CRITICAL
HISTORY WITH A SELECTION OF Tecrs  192 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1983) (1957).
13. VITORIA, On Law, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 163 (his emphasis).
14. Anthony  Pagden &  Jeremy Lawrance, Introduction to VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS,
supra note 10, at )(v.
15. See PATRICK RILEY, THE GENERAL WILL BEFORE ROUSSEAU, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE DIVINE INTO THE CIVIL 40 (Princeton Univ. Press 1986).
16. VITORIA, On Law, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 155.
17. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On Homicide, i n  OBRAS DE FRANCISCO DE VITORiA:
RELECCiONES TEOLOGIcAs 1100 (Teofi lo Urdanoz trans., Editorial Catolica, Biblioteca de Autores
Cristianos 1960).
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era' the natural propensities of things."
18 S o ,  e v e n  
i f  a l l  
t h i s  
s t i l l  
l e f t
earthly natural law derivative of a transcendent divine law, access or at-
tachment to that divine law was not necessary for either the integrity or
the efficacy of natural law, or indeed for the ability to know 11.
19 I t  c a nbe known omprehensively by human reason being brought to bear on
nature.
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revelation, and it can exist even if  the godhead did not. And that natural
law could be rendered as an earthly lus gentium.
This profanation accompanied and enabled the subjection of reli-
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trated in the diversity of kingdoms and nrincipalities T he Catholic and
niversal cohesion of religious and political power, to the extent that it
ever existed, was becoming increasingly attenuated. Hence we have the
adventitious association of Vitoria with the Reformation. The erstwhile
tying of kingdoms and principalities, these proto-nations, to the universal
ius gentium is broken, and an ersatz Grotius provides now the "true"
source of the ius gentium: the surpassing and singular nation. Such a
nation can effect the impossibility of a complete, quasi-imperial control
of the domain of its relation to others, including nations, the domain of
the international and of international law. This  meant, in Vattel's stark
formulation from the eighteenth century, that the society of nations was
to have no overarching commonalty, and this to such a complete extent
that none of its members "yield r i g h t s  to the general body," each sov-
reign state being "independent of all the others."
2I T h e n c e  w e  
h a v e  o n e
forgetting of Vitoria, a forgetting effected in his jurisprudential relega-
tion as an opaque and uncertain founder of what was a rather more reso-
lute international law. But what will be central here is another forgetting
of Vitoria, a forgetting postponed. What is forgotten, eventually, is the
divine, and indeed imperial, origin of secular political authority in the
Occident. For now, for Vitoria, political domination of the religious still
subsists in a reference to a divine source of authority, a source on which
18. Id. at 1099.
19. VITORIA, On Law, i n POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 164.
20. Id at 155, 164.
21. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL LAW APPLIED
TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 9 (C.G. Fenwick trans., Car-
negie Inst. 1916) (1758). That standard perception of Vattel should be qualified by the refined en-
gagement i n GEORG CAVALLAR, THE RIGHTS OF STRANGERS: THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL
HOSPITALITY, THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY, AND POLITICAL JUSTICE SINCE VITORIA 306-17 (Ashgate
Publ'g 2002). T he broad lines of  that qualification would have Vattel according substance to the
international.
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the political depends so as to combine, like the god of monotheism, its
determinate existence with an unconstrained efficacy.
22 There is yet another combining which the godhead has to effect,
one that will also prove central to my argument. We can come to it by
way of Ullmann's observation of the "stark contrast" in the Middle Ages
and then beyond of "two contrasting themes which portray the creation
of law." With "the one called the ascending theme of government and
law, [ i ] t s  main point is that law-creative power is located in the peo-
ple itself"; the one "[o]pposed to this ascending theme is the descending
one according to which original power is located not in the broad base of
the people but in an otherworldly being, in divinity itself." Here "the
office holders are not representatives: they are only delegates of the su-
preme Ruler."
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"themes" through the mediation of God.
24 T h e  
" c o m m o n w e a l t h "  
f o r m e d
from "the multitude," or the people, "has power by divine law," together
with representatives "who t ke upon themselves the responsibilities of
the commonwealth."
25 T h e  
m o n a r c
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since "[t]he commonwealth as such cannot frame laws, propose policies,
judge disputes, punish transgressors, or generally impose its laws on the
individual."
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divine law, not from the commonwealth or from men."
27 From a temporally encompassing perspective, both sources of pow-
er operate within a "self-sufficient," "perfect community":
22. Banking on my precautionary saving of other histories near the outset, and by way of sup-
porting this culmination of the story so far, Schmitt in Der Nomos moves beyond Vitoria as the
expressive apotheosis of the law of the Republica Christiana by noting its supercession in the ius
publicum Europaeum, a law based solely on secularizing European states. Theologians are thence
told to depart the scene. As  Schmitt sees the resulting situation, the acolytes of the new order offer
no cohering basis for it, and he would make good this deficiency by showing how that order subsists
on what can only be a sacral ground, somewhat literally: a nomos of the earth. This nomos entails
two marvellous consequences. One is the combining of "concrete order" with "orientations" beyond
any given or contained order. T he other marvellous consequence is the ability of this nomos to
provide a singular ground, a world-ground, generated in the imperial "land-appropriation of a new
world" of the Americas, a ground for a "European international law" made up of  state entities that
are completely distinct yet related to each other in somehow sustaining this ground of  their being
with each other. See CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE Jus PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 16, 69, 70, 82-83, 121, 127, 135 (G. L. Ulmen trans., Telos Press
2003)(1950).
23. WALTER ULLMANN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SOURCES OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 30-31, 63 (Cornell Univ. Press 1975).
24. VITORIA, On Civil Power, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 12, 14.
25. M at 14.
26. Id
27. Id This entails something of a division of powers and functions between these sources: see
the, as ever, nuanced account i n Pagden &  Lawrance, Introduction to VITORIA, POLITICAL
WRITINGS, supra note 10, at XVii—XX (his emphasis).
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What is a 'perfect' community? Let us begin by noting that a 'per-
fect' thing is one in which nothing is lacking, just as an 'imperfect'
thing is one in which something is lacking: 'perfect' means, then,
'complete in  itse lf  (quod totum est, perfectum quid). A  perfect
community or commonwealth is therefore one which is complete in
itself; that is, one which is not part of another commonwealth, but
has its own laws, its own independent policy, and its own magis-
trates.28
In this way Vitoria aptly and pointedly accommodated the already
formed or forming "sovereign" states of Europe that were, in varying
ways, subordinating the so-called spiritual power of the papacy and the
Holy Roman Empire to their own "temporal" claims on power and au-
thority.
These various components of Vitoria's template for modem legal
and political formation will be emphasized as we explore other historic-
ities, but there is one final component understandably not developed by
Vitoria which was to assume a pivotal significance: the component of
nature as found, for example, in natural law. The almost pervasive story
here is that the Aristotelian and Thomist constrictions on what can be
generatively conceived of as nature, their mantric affirmations of a de-
mcinated "authority," give way to an open and dynamic science of nature
based on the perception of natural phenomena. There is some continuity
of belief in God's sovereignty over or identification with nature, but this
is now the notorious "God of the gaps," a god who retained independent
significance only to the ever decreasing extent that science does not ac-
count for natural phenomena. The "domain assumption" of this science
is that it can substitute for the deity without claiming transcendence be-
cause it is purely demonstrative.
29 Y e t  t h e r e  
i s  a  
t r a n s c e n d
e n t  
b e l i e
f  
i n
this very claim to the demonstrable, a claim not just to what is but also to
what so far is not and will or may yet be. Both the claim and the unitary
constitution of this nature are an inheritance of monotheism. And its in-
cipient effect on law is to propel "law" into a more constricted deontol-
ogy.
REVOLUTION
Starting with the first revolution in my next slice of historicity, one
extending over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English rev-
olution destroys the connection between monarch and the divine, but
does so by way of destroying the monarch rather than the connection
28. VITORIA, On the Law of War, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 10, at MI.
29. The phrase "domain assumption" comes from At.viN W. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS
OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 31 (Heinemann 1971).
20091 Law, Modtrniry and the
explicitly. Despite the gradualist gluss g i
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counts, this was a revolutionary rupture that soon saw the end of monar-
cal nale. Tne incipiently modernist apostle - v o l u t i o n ,  and my
ext epochal thinker, is Thomas Hobbes,
To many these could be puzzling accolades. Hobbes. after all, wa
sconcerned to affirm effective order and stable authority atter one of the
most uncivil of civil wars. Thence, and going for now with the grain of
conventional scholarship. Hobbes takes us to a state, of nature demonstra-
tively posited in which the "life of man" is "solitary, poor, nasty, brut
and short"; a state in which "our natural passions" put us in opposit
each other in "a war as is of every man against every man."' So wii ai-
ls this the case that we must perforce transfer "all power and strength
"a sovereign Leviathan to whom ' g i v e
329
of governing my-
self," and to whom the subject is a l l  actions of Leviathan
'as if  they were his own"; subjects are thus inextricably bound to Levia-
than, a sovereign "that beareth their person"---"none of his subjects • , •
can be freed from his subjection."
31 A n y t h i n g  
l e s s  
t h a n  
t h i s  
t o t a l  
c o m -
mitment to Leviathan leaves scope for our recusant natural passions and
for a reversion to the lawlessness of the savage state, "to the confusion of
a disunited multitude."
32 T h e n c e ,  
i t  
m u s t  
b e  
t h a
t  
" w h
e n  
t h
e  
p e o
p l e  
c l
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-
meth anything oth rwise than be the voice of the sovereign power. h i
claim of the people," but rather, only the claim of ,hose particu-
lar men" making it .
33 Understandably enough, to have such a complete and m u g
sway this "great Leviathan" would have to be conceived of as a"mortal
god."
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lously have to combine being determinate with an unconstrained effi-
cacy. Unlike the "immortal God," however, the sovereign Leviathan has
to do this without recourse to a transcendental reference fusing these
contrary dimensions of  its being. Hobbes offers no resolved way in
which the being-in-the world of  this mortal god could be constituentiy
comprehended. He does offer a seeming alternative In that, cling as we
must to this mortal God, we remain "under the immortal G " 3 5  This
30. TH0MAS HOBBES, LEviA•fitAN 85, 87 (Encyclopedia
- B r i t a n n i c a  & i n c .  
C o r p .  
1 9 5 2 )  
( 1 6 5 1 )
(ch. 13 & 14). Eve  i f oneaccepts Macpherson's designating the state of nature as "hypothetical
(which my reading of Hobbes does not), that would not Sc incompatibie with the "scientific
- q u a l i t yof its observation. C . B. Macpherson, introduction to THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 40 (Penguin
Books 1985)( 1654
31.1d. at 100-01 (chs. 17 & 18),
32. Id. at 101 (ch. 18).
33, THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS Or LAW, NATURAL AND POLiTiCAL 119 (Kessin er
Publ'g 2004) (1540) (cla 27, 1 9)_
34. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 100 (ch. 17).
35. id.
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subjection, however, hardly challenges the pervasive supremacy of the
mortal God. Such supremacy would only enable the subject to disobey a
sovereign denial of the Christian faith or of the lordship of Christ; other-
wise and unreservedly God "speaketh by his vice-gods or lieutenants
here on earth," by those who have sovereign power.
36 N o r ,  a s  w a s  
p o s s i -
ble with the schol stic schema, can some resolving supremacy be found
in law. Law, rather, is constituted as the "command" of the sovereign
Leviathan "addressed to one o b l i g e d  to obey him," the sovereign be-
ing "the sole legislator," the "common power" necessary for there to be
law."
In a work that will, or should, transform the study of Hobbes, James
Martel has revealed a very different Leviathan, one in which a people
can be together and generate authority in "horizontal" relations, as op-
posed to the vertical subjugation to Leviathan.
38 T h i s  c o m e s  
a b o u t  i n
two linked ways. With  one, in our creative ability of reading, Hobbes
finds a generative capacity transposed to political formation.
39 W i t h  t h eother, Martel "takes seriously" Hobbes's engagement with religion and
scriptural interpretation and in so doing he finds that for the Hobbes of
Leviathan we exist in an "in-between time": a time between what was
once and will again be rule by God, but a time in which for now we as a
people are left to our own devices even as we are impelled in the realiza-
tion of our being together by the "pure and empty hypostatization" that is
the Holy Spir it.
° As well as this sacral infusion, there are other forces formative of a
people, and these often connect to and qualify the power of the sovereign
Leviathan. For a start, in a certain literal sense, the sovereign is the crea-
tion of people covenanting with each other. That entails something of a
threshold problem in that for Hobbes, "when there is no civ il power
erected over the parties promising s u c h  promises are no covenants":
"[The validity of covenants begins w i t h  the constitution of a civil
power sufficient to compel men to keep them."
41 C l e a r l y  a n  
e x c e p t i o n
has to be found, and Hobbes also affirms that "covenant[s] entered into
by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory."
42 D e s p i t e  t h i s
36. HOEIBES, ELEMENTS, supra note 33, at 101, 114-15 (ch. 25, 1 5; ch. 26,111 10-11). The
"ascending" thrust of this is qualified later.
37. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 88, 130 (chs. 15 & 26).
38. JAMES R. MARTEL, SUBVERTING THE LEVIATHAN: READING THOMAS HOBBES AS A
RADICAL DEMOCRAT 135 (Columbia Univ. Press 2007).
39. Id at ch. 2.
40. Id at 102, 184. A l l  of  which does infinitely less than justice to the nuance of Martel's
"reading."
41. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 91 (ch. 15).
42. Id at 89 (ch. 14). Hobbes was often to counter, for the state of nature, the argument that a
covenant entered into out of fear was not valid: "for then it would follow that those promises which
2009] L a w ,  Modernity and the Sacred 3 3 1
compelling element and the dismal condition o f  the state o f  nature,
Hobbes does recognise that some restraints and normative cohesion do
exist in the state of nature.
43 T h e n ,  
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of "natural laws," "the first and fundamental of which is: to seek peace
and follow it ."
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strive to accommodate himself to the rest," an imperative founded "in
man's aptn ss to society."
45 I n  t h e  
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"reaso  suggesteth convenient articles of peace upon which men may be
drawn to agr ement. These articles are they which otherwise are called
the laws of nature."
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clination of nature."
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natural law "is also wont to be called Divine," a law "given by God to
every man for the rule of his actions."
48 As one would expect from such a substantial people and "man,"
they are not simply supine before an all-demanding Leviathan. The same
law of nature impelling men to enter into the primal covenant by which
they created Leviathan does not "command any divesting of other rights,
than those only which cannot be retained without the loss of peace," and
indeed, "many rights are retained, when we enter into peace one with
another."'" Hobbes also propounds an extensive list of "liberties" se-
cured to the subject of Leviathan.
50 W h a t  i s  
m o r e ,  
L e v i a t h a n  
r e m a i n
s
bound by the primal terms of the covenant and thence cannot act in a
way cont ary to the preservation and protection of the life of its sub-
jects.
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consisteth in the good government of the people," something which in-
volves securing "the safety of the people," and "by safety here is not
meant a bare preservation, but also all the contentments of life which
every man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the common-
wealth, shall acquire to himself."
52 L e v i a t h a n  
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t h e n c e  
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reduc'd men to civill l ife, and by which Lawes were made, might likewise be of  none effect."
THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 25 (Kessinger Publ'g 2004) (1642) (ch. 2,11 XVI).
43. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 90,99 (chs. 14,17).
44. Id. at 86 (ch. 14). And for the abundance, see id. (chs. 14,15 generally). Here there is now
t he ind is pens ib le  S A M A NT HA  FROST,  LESSONS F RO M A  MAT ERI ALI ST  T HI NKER:  HO BBESI AN
REFLECTIONS ON ETHICS AND POLITICS 116-25 (Stanford Univ. Press 2008).
45. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 93 (ch. 15) (his emphasis).
46. Id. at 86 (ch. 13) (his emphasis).
47. HOBBES, ELEMENTS, supra note 33, at 58 (ch. 16,114).
48.  HOBBES, DE CIVE,  supra not e 42,  at  41 (ch.  4,  pt .  I ) ;  see also HOBBES, ELEMENTS, supra
note 33, at ch. 18.
49. HOBBES, ELEMENTS, supra note 33, at 61 (ch. 17,1 2).
50. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at ch. 20.
51./d. at 115 (ch. 21).
52. HOBBES, ELEMENTS, supra note 33, at 122 (ch. 28,111); HoBBEs, LEVIATHAN, supra note
30, at 153 (ch. 30) (his emphasis).
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most extensive "duties," as well as practical dictates of rule and peda-
gogic responsibilities, all for ensuring the well-being and improvement
of the people.
53 And so also with law, one finds the like restraints and constituent
effects on the sovereign. Although, as we saw, law is the command of
the sovereign, not only are there intrinsic qualities of law to which the
sovereign must conform, but laws also depend on their reception by his
subjects, depend on their knowing the law and on their interpretation of
it -
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philosopher, who is o f  course always right, proffers the hard-headed
view that it is " in their own interest" for Kings "to make Laws as the
people can endure, and may keep them without impatience, and live in
strength and courage to defend their King and Countrey."
55 M o s t  r e -markably, perhaps, the very laws made by Leviathan, the civil laws, are
found in a sense to bind Leviathan, for just as men have been able to cre-
ate a sovereign Leviathan, "so also have they made artificial chains,
called civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fas-
tened at one end to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have
given the sovereign power, and at the other end to their own ears."
56 In all, whilst Hobbes's scheme reflects the Vitorian template re-
markably, especially so given Hobbes's opposition to scholasticism, it
also departs from that template in its proto-modemity. Hobbes is not
infrequently seen as providing an origin myth of modem political and
legal formation.
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just to what we were but to what we are now. And like all good myths of
origin, the one Hobbes gives us embeds the insuperable yet constituent
contradictions of our being-together. Generically, the myth will usually
"resolve" the contradiction by some reference to or intervention from
beyond, a reference or intervention that combines a sacred and enacts a
transcendent with a profane actuality. More pointedly, the question of
the origin figures the condition of our being-together, a condition that
must combine the infinite possibility of being (what is before the origin)
with its existent determinacy (what is originated). One combining was
instanced by Vitoria in the reference to a monotheistic deity, fusing these
53. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at ch. 30.
54. Id at 134, 139, 156-57 (chs. 26, 27, & 30).
55.THomAs HOBBES, A  DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE
COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 166,204 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1681).
56. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 113 (ch. 21) (his emphasis). The binding of Levia-
than here is reinforced in the obvious reference to and contrast with Job 41:1, 3, 5. See also
HoBBEs, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 148 (chs. 28-31).
57. For a recent instance, see J. M. COETZEE, DIARY OF A BAD YEAR 3-4 (Harvill Secker
2007).
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dimensions of being in and as itself. Hobbes, the modernist, eschews
that resort and resituates the deity by way of advancing two other combi-
natory forces also found in the Vitorian template—law and the people.
Somewhat like Vitoria, the worlded deity of Hobbes endows a peo-
ple by way of natural law and the Holy Spirit. This process intermingles
with the force of a "nature" scientifically asserted. Natural propensities
are formative also of Leviathan, but here the worlding of the deity pro-
ceeds to the point of near-effective rupture with the transcendent. Levia-
than is a "mortal god" whose subordination "under the immortal God" is
reduced to near-insignificance.
58 I n  t h e  
v e r y  
c o m p a r i s
o n  
o f  
t h e  
h u m
a n
creatio  of Leviathan with "thatfiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced
by God in the Creation," Leviathan is confirmed as being of the world,
"that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in
Latin CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature
and strength than the natuml."
59 So, going back to the beginning of our conversation with Hobbes,
whilst in Leviathan he was concerned with the affirmation of stable rule
and persistent order, it was not the old rule or the old order. As  his con-
temporaries appreciated, Hobbes was putting in place a new foundation
for order, one in which the monarch played no necessary part and one in
which a transcendent reference by way of "divine right" had no place,
" [for  God made Kings for the People, and not People for the Kings."
6°What, as it were, takes the cohering place of a divinity now divided, and
as we saw, is an imbrication of law and the people.
There is much revolutionary refinement of this outcome in the eigh-
teenth century, and here the inescapable apostle, or perhaps even proph-
et, is Rousseau. For  Rousseau, there was something close to fusion be-
tween law and the people. Law was the way in which the people became
and remained a people, became a determinate people whilst preserving
the freedom of the people; and law was, furthermore, the way in which
the people operatively became sovereign.
6I L a w s ,  f o r  
R o u s s e a u ,  
" a r e
really nothing other than the conditions on which civil society exists."
62We can discern this primal quality of law, and its quality as "nothing
other," by remarking how law navigates the famed, the "original" conun-
58. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 100 (ch. 17).
59. Id. at 47 (his emphasis).
60. HOBBES, DIALOGUE, supra note 55, at 61 [15]. A n d  for the general point, see JEFFREY R.
COLLINS, THE ALLEGIANCE OF THOMAS HOBBES (Ox ford Univ. Press 2005).
61. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A Discourse on Political Economy, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
AND DISCOURSES 135-36 (J. H. Brumfin & John C. Hall eds., G. D. H. Cole trans., J. M. Dent 1986)
(1755).
62. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 83 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin
Books 1968) (1762) (bk. I I
,  c h .  6 ) .
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drum Rousseau extracts from the social contract: for a "people" to be
"formed t h e  effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit
which must be the product of social institutions would have to preside
over the setting up of those institutions; men would have to have already
become before the advent of law that which they become as a result of
law."
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passe by resort to Hobbes's method, one quite common to the genre: that
is, the method of emplacing the originated before the origin. Rousseau's
state of nature was peopled, more typically of his time, by the solitary
savage." Rousseau's resort here involves a deity as aptly mysterious as
the monotheistic God of revelation. "Gods," announces Rousseau, gods
plural, "would be needed to give men laws."
65 I n  a  m o r e  
r e v e a l i n g  
v e i n ,
Rousseau finds that for laws to be effective and lasting they had to come
from a quasi-divine lawgiver possessed of an entirely disinterested "great
soul," a lawgiver always selflessly attuned to possibility and able "to
make the Gods speak."
66 Y e t ,  
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beyond human powers," it is a task the achievement of which Rousseau
sees as necessary in the world.
° I t  i s  a  
a s k  
w h i c h  
R o u s s e
a u  
c o n fi g u
r e s
to t e qualities of the lawgiver. I n  bestowing the laws of the constitu-
tion, the lawgiver has to create a social bond that integrates individuals
into it, a bond believed in by those individuals, and one that is lasting.
To perform these tasks, the god-like lawgiver has to be quite apart from
the nation being so endowed, and has to be lacking in any authority,
right, force or interest to create the laws. Not  only is the law so given
incapable of being encompassed by the determinate national sovereign,
but for good measure the only way in which the sovereign can act is "to
make laws," even though, for Rousseau, "the sovereign power" is wholly
"absolute," "sacred," and wholly "inviolable."
68 R o u s s e a u  
w o u l d  g o  
s o
far as to equate departure from the "voice" of law "alone" with a return
to the divisive an  "pure state of nature."
69 A l t h o u g h  
R o u s s e a u  
d o e s  
n o t
go so far as t  connect the two, he does provide the means for comple-
menting the unconditional quasi-deific lawgiver with another law—the
emplaced, the determinate law. T he  imperative unconditionality that
accompanies the giving of the law can be matched by a determinacy nec-
essary for the receiving of it, and Rousseau provides a list of attributes
63. Id at 86-87 (bk. 11, ch. 7).
64. See generally ROUSSEAU, A Discourse on the Origin o f  Inequality, i n THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, supra note 61.
65. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 62, at 84 (bk. 11, ch. 7).
66. Id at 87 (bk. 11, ch. 7).
67. Id. at 86 (bk. 11, ch. 7).
68. Id at bk. III, chs. 4, 6.
69. RoussEAu, A Discourse on Political Economy, supra note 61, at 136.
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needed for a people to be "fit to receive laws," attributes which amount
to a determinate autarchy."
Thus far, Rousseau's resort to the deific could be seen as one of the
more intriguing of Enlightenment findings that the political as "secular"
can exist only "as if '  suscitated by some deity or sacred law.
71 Y e t ,  e v e nthat did not exhaust Rousseau's inventiveness on this score, for there is
also his elevation of a "civil religion" that binds citizens to the state?'
The most remarkable thing about this religion is that it affirms the exis-
tence of God who is seemingly the Christian God yet is nonetheless to be
conceived of as completely effective in the world.
73 S o ,  t h e  fi r s t  
d o g m a
of such religion is "th  existence of [ t h i s ]  omnipotent intelligent, be-
nevolent divinity," but to see this divinity in "theocratic" terms would,
for Rousseau, be "pemicious."
74 R a t h e r ,  
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l a i d  
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the sovereign and then not "strictly as religious dogmas" but as the sub-
stance o f  "a profession of  faith which is purely c iv il," a profession
"without which it is impossible to be either a good citizen or a loyal sub-
ject," all of which for Rousseau does not involve "any question of theol-
ogy.
" 
7 5  
S
o
,  
a
s  
w
e
l
l  
a
s  
f
a
i
t
h  
i
n  
a  
d
i
v
i
n
i
t
y
,  
t
h
e  
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g  
d
o
g
m
a
s  
w
o
u
l
d
require the citizen to believe in "the life to come; the happiness of the
just; the punishment of sinners; the sanctity of the social contract and the
law."'" That is a list in which, operatively, the last shall be first, since for
Rousseau, to repeat, "[L]aws are really nothing other than the conditions
on which civil society exists."
77 There remains a revolution the absence of which so far is starting to
feel rather pressing, not least because it provides something of an apo-
theosis of the configuration of divinity, law and the people, and as such it
70. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 62, at 95 (bk. II, ch. 10).
71. This particular "as i f '  comes from Kant in the following exemption from the imperative
sapere aude:
A law that is so holy (inviolable) that it is already a crime even to call i t in doubt in a
practical way, and so to suspend its effect for a moment, is thought as i f it must have ari-
sen not from human beings but from some highest, flawless lawgiver; and that is what the
saying 'Al l  authority is from God' means. This saying is not an assertion about the his-
torical basis of the civil constitution; i t instead sets forth an idea as a practical principle
of reason; the principle that the presently existing legislative authority ought to be ob-
eyed, whatever its origin.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 95 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1996) (1797) [6:319] (his emphasis).
72. See ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 62, at 185 (bk. IV, ch. 8).
73. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Em in 274-332 (Barbara Foxley trans., J. M. Dent 1993)
(1762).
74. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 62, at 187 (bk. IV, ch. 8).
75. Id at 186 (bk. IV, ch. 8).
76. Id
77 I d  at 83 ()k. II, ch. 6).
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comes to provide the exemplary instance of civil religion.
78 T h e  c o n t r i -bution of that revolution can be carried by a certain Declaration made "in
the Name and by the authority of the good People of these Colonies,"
and made by their "Representatives of the United States of America."
The originality, the newness, of creation by a people in terms of the Dec-
laration is not to deny that there were continuities of a kind, inevitably.
79Nonetheless, here we have the first invented nation, one that is "de-
clared" into being in the rejection of what came before and in the genera-
tive affirmation of what is "institute[d]" as "new Government," an affir-
mation that comes from "the Right of the People," that same "good Peo-
ple" in whose "Name" and by whose "Authority" the constituent "Decla-
ration" is made. W e  come immediately to Rousseau's classic conun-
drum: "the people" generating the Declaration are declared into existence
by the Declaration—all in a feat of what Derrida would call "fabulous
retroactivity!"
80 What is thus declared into existence is an amply acknowledged en-
dowment of God. There would seem to be two gods involved here, or
the two dimensions of Christian monotheism already encountered. One
involves "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," which laws "entitle"
a people to a "separate and equal station." This would seem to be the
god of deism, a god of nature whose constituent laws are enduringly de-
terminate and knowable as such. I t  would seem to be the same god in-
voked as a "Creator" that endows people with "Rights" that impel them
to form "Government" so as to secure these rights. When it comes to the
formative and performative declaration itself, however, a more evident
theism is invoked. This  resort is to "the Supreme Judge of the world"
who is appealed to "for the rectitude of our intentions," the intentions of
"the Representatives" who "declare, that These United Colonies are, and
of Right ought to be Free and Independent States." Judging and being
the store of rectitude require qualities akin to those of the other god of
monotheism, the god of revelation and nature confounded, a god of alter-
ity, a god ranging beyond any determinate order. When these dimen-
sions of the deity are combined, they match a people that can assume a
conditioned, a determinate and delimited presence, yet with their "Au-
78. As to the latter, see especially RoBERT N. BELLAH, Civi l  Religion i n America, i n
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION (Russell E. Richey &  Donald G. Jones eds., Harper &  Row 1974)
(1967).
79. The signatories to the Declaration could be seen "as defenders of a history accomplished"
rather than producers of a "sudden" or "extraordinary birth outside the processes of time." GARRY
WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERsoN's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 38 (The Athlone Press
1978) (vii,xix).
80.  JACQUE DERRIDA,  Dec lar at ions  o f  I ndependence,  in  NEGOTIATIONS: INTERVENTIONS AND
INTERVIEWS, 1971-2001 50 (Elizabeth Rottenberg trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2002) (1976).
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thority" and "Right" can also and continuously be unconditional and il-
limitably generative.
At this stage, the inevitable invocation of de Tocqueville comes in-
to play, and it does so not so much for the customary references to the
religiosity of "America" and the pervasive force of its law,
8I b u t  m o r ebecause of a combining of these two qualities. In  seeking "to character-
ize Anglo-American civilization," he finds it to be "the result o f  two
quite distinct ingredients w h i c h  Americans have succeeded somehow
to meld together in wondrous harmony; namely the spirit of religion and
the spirit of liberty."
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invariant d votion, whereas with the spirit of liberty,
political principles, laws, and human institutions appear flexible and
can be shaped at will into any combination. Before their advance,
the barriers which imprisoned the society into which they were born
were lowered; old opinions which for centuries had governed the
world, melted away. An almost limitless path, a field without hori-
zon opened before them; the human spirit rushes forward to travel
these places.
83The rush of  spirit stops short, however, "at the limits of  the political
world," beyond which limits the enduring content of religion supervenes,
a religion that is "the guardian of  morality," o f  "the moral world," a
world in which "everything is classified, systematized, anticipated, and
decided beforehand," and that morality in turn is  "the guarantee o f
law."
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two inclinations, despite their apparent opposition, seem to walk in mu-
tual agreement and support."
85 A n d ,  i t  
c o u l d  
b e  
e m p h a s i
z e d ,  
l a
w  
i s  
t h
e
only entity inhabiting both inclinations, the "almost limitless path, a field
with ut horizon" and the calculable solidity of "the moral world."
IV. MODERNISM
The broadcasting of God's death by one of Nietzsche's seers, "the
madman" of The Gay Science, was soon followed by this pronouncement
of another, Zarathustra: "[Plead are all gods."
86 F o r  t h e  s a k e  
o f  c o r n -81. E.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 206 (Gerald E. Bevan trans.,
Penguin Books 2003) (1835) (pt. 2, ch. 2 & pt. 1, ch. 6).
82. Id at 55 (pt. 1, ch. 2) (his emphasis).
83.1d.
84. Id at 55-56 (pt. 1, ch. 2).
85. M
86. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 59 (Adrian Del Caro & Robert B.
Pippin eds., Adrian del Cam trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1883-1885) (On the Bestowing
Virtue, § 3); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 119-20 (Bernard Williams ed., Josefine
Nauckboff trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1882) (1125).
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pleteness, Blanchot would add that here "God means God, but also eve-
rything that in rapid succession, has sought to take his place!"
87 A l l  o fwhich can bec me, however, the chronicle of a death postponed. Start-
ing with that most religious of irreligious tracts, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
we find a significant successor, the "new idol" that is the state—the state
arrogating "the ordaining finger of  God," the clear reference being to
Moses bringing down to the world the tablets "written with the finger of
God."
88 
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would seek to take over "the ordaining finger of God" is that entity's in-
escapable determinacy. Whils t the state's incipient arrogation of all that
could be ramps this new idol up to a transcendent status, there is no tran-
scendence for it to occupy, as it were. Such putative endowing of a de-
terminacy creates a terminal entity. So, for Zarathustra, "the sign of the
state.. signifies the will to death."
89 T h e r e  i s  
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poignant r ndition will suffice here, the one in which the state is de-
scribed as "a death-horse clattering in the regalia of  divine honors!"
9°The other marked character of this state is that "[e]verything about it is
false";
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tuted or "telling" in terms of an illimitable efficacy cannot help but be
false.
Returning to the hardly less heady reaches of  The Gay Science,
Nietzsche unleashes two visions consequent on the death of God. The
first vision comes with the "collapse" that ensues from the loss of "this
faith," and it forebodes for "the next century" a "deep darkness"—"the
shadows that must soon envelop Europe."
93 T h a t  c o u l d  
b e  r e a d  
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n e  
o f
several instances of Nietzsche's percipience of disasters to come, includ-
ing totalitarian compr hensions.
94 W h i l s t  
t h e  
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s t a t e  
h a s  
a s  
i t s
truth, "t e truth of death," and thence cannot endure in its appropriation
of "life" within an enduring determinacy,
95 e v e n  w i t h  
t h e  
s t a t e ' s  
c l a i m i n g
"at any one time" to hold "life" in enduringly determinate part, there is
87. MAURICE BLANCHOT, THE INFINITE CONVERSATION 144 (Susan Hanson trans., Univ. of
Minn. Press 1993)(1969).
88. See Exodus 31:18; Deuteronomy 9:10.
89. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 86, at 35 (On the New Idol).
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id at 34 (On the New Idol).
93. NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 86, at 199 ell 343).
94. See also, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 8, at
134-35 (Third Essay,* 27).
95. See JEAN-Luc NANCY, THE INOPERATIVE COMMUNITY 12 (Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus,
Michael Holland, & Simona Sawhney eds., Peter Connor trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1991) (1983);
and NIETZSCHE, Thus SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 86, at 35 (On the New Idol).
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still a total comprehending entailed in securing the part both itself and in
it in relation to everything that would ever come to it .
96 From this first dark vision Nietzsche proceeds seamlessly to the ex-
altation of a second vision, a vision of light, a vision of "a new dawn" in
which "our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, forebodings, ex-
pectation."
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ated throughout Zarathustra,
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the "open sea."
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coming" the oppressively existent—an overcoming not in terms o f  a
messianism disconnected from the existent, but one which is "bridged"
from the present condition, a condition inclusive of the "new idol" of the
state, and an overcoming that is the outcome of a long development.
mPut in the context of these two contrary visions, what this amounts to is a
connection between them in which the time of the first is overcome in
the world. Transposed to the now-defunct deity, the two visions can be
seen as corresponding to the constituent dimensions of monotheism, the
dimensions of perfect determinacy and perfect ever-surpassing; but with
the transcendent capacity to combine these dimensions gone, they are,
short of the overcoming, divided in the world.
I f  we are not to be consigned either to the terminal stasis of the first
dimension or to the infinite irresolution of  the second, there must be
some way of bringing these dimensions together in the world. Nietzsche
laid out a means that could do this, and that means was law. His concep-
tion of  law is more usually associated with the first dimension, most
dramatically in the elevation of creativity as a breaking of the "old tab-
lets" of the law—the creator as "lawbreaker."
1131 Y e t  a  
c o n s t a n t  
c r e a t i v i t y
requires also the breaking of any "new tablet."
1ce A n d  w e  fi n d  
t h a  
t h e r e
are variou  cre tive types of a rather assertive kind, philosophers whose
"creating is a law-giving," a legislating, and this would import not only
that law was their instrument but also that it was integral to the creation
96. Cf JACQUES DERMA, SPURS: N1ETzscHE's STYLES 1
2 5  ( B a r b a r a  H a r l o w  
t r a n s . ,  
U n i v .  
o f
Chicago Press 1979).
97.  NIETZSCHE, THE G AY SCIENCE, supra not e 86,  at  199 ( 1343) .
98. The relevant part of THE GAY SCIENCE, Book Five, was added after the publication of
THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA.
99. NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 86, at 199 (
1
1 1 3 4 3 ) .
00. See generally NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 86, at 36 (On the New
Idol), 56,58 (On the Bestowing Virtue), 65 (On the Blessed Isles), and 110 (On Redemption). And
as for  development specifically, see e.g., NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 8, at
134-35 (Third Essay, § 27).
101. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 86, at 164,171 (On Old and New
Tablets, §§ 15,26).
102. Id. at 165 (On Old and New Tablets, § 16).
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itself.
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between creation and law more distinctly into the second dimension. To
draw on Heidegger's admirably pointed rendition:
Art is not only subject to rules, must not only obey laws, but is in it-
self legislation. Only  as legislation is it truly art. What is inex-
haustible, what is to be created, is the law. Ar t  that dissolves style
in mere ebullition of feelings misses the mark, in that its discovery
of law is essentially disturbed; such discovery can become actual in
art only when the law drapes itself in freedom of form, in order in
that way to come openly into play. IN
Whilst it is dangerous to say what Nietzsche did not do, it seems we
should now resort to the tradition of Nietzsche, broadly conceived, to
find a more resolute combining of the two dimensions in and as law.
1135This is a law, Blanchot tells us, that "affirms itself as law w i t h o u t
reference to anything higher: to it  alone, pure transcendence."
m6 A l -though it masquerades as mundane, this is law as the neo-sacral, the law
that has always to come from beyond, self-separating from that beyond, a
separation, according to Blanchot again, "that institutes it as form, in the
very movement by which it formulates this exteriority as law."
m7 T h i s ,of course, and insisting on the mundane, seems counter to law as the rule
of law, as the guarantee of some determinate order. Yet, for law to rule it
must be of the beyond, capable of a complete responsiveness to alterity,
otherwise it would cease to rule what is and will be an ever-changing
world around it. I n  this ultimacy of responsive rule, and in a seeming
paradox, law becomes a vacuity. Law must, says Derrida, "be without
history, genesis, or any possible derivation."
1138 L a w ,  t h e n ,  
i s  l e f t  
w i t h  
n o
enduring content of i s own. I t  always depends for its very content and
for much of its force on some power apart from itself. "Law itself," says
Nancy, "does not have a form for what would need to be its own sover-
W I  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 83 (Helen Zimmem trans., Dover
Publ'ns 1997) (1886) (11211). Nietzsche's anthropology of law in the Second Essay of NIETZSCHE,
GENEALOGY OF MORALS, although concerned with the emergence of the calculable as and in law, is
also a story of a creative going beyond difference stages of legal formation. See, e.g., NIETZSCHE,
ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 8, at 55-57 (Second Essay, § 11).
104. 1 MARTIN HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE VOLUMES I AND II: THE WILL TO POWER AS ART AND
THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME 130-31 (David Farrell Krell trans., HarperOne 1991).
105. Most notably perhaps in JACQUES DERRIDA, Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of
Authority', in ACTS OF RELIGION (Gil Anicljar ed., Mary Quaintance, trans., Routledge 2002).
106. MAURICE BLANCHOT, THE STEP NOT BEYOND 25 (Lycette Nelson trans., State Univ. of
N.Y. Press 1992) (1973).
107. BLANCHOT, THE INFINITE CONVERSATION, supra note 87, at 434.
108. JACQUES DERRIDA, Before the Law, in ACTS OF LITERATURE 191 (Avital Ronell trans.,
Routledge 1992).
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eigmty."
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the law "of '  the "sovereign" nation-state. Thence, law is a dependent
creation of this particular "new idol," this "theological phantasm."
11° Y e tthe opposite is "also" the case. The law is the vicarious carrier of the
nation-state's necessary receptivity to what could ever be. Should the
enduringly determinate nation-state be so receptive in and as itself, it
would deliquesce.
For Nietzsche, this quasi-deific division, that between the new idol
and the "inexhaustible" law,
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death of God, leave us with "the magnitude of the deed t o o  great for
1.18."
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013yrne trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2000) (1996).
110. Jacques Derrida, A Discussion with Jacques Derrida, 5 THEORY AND EVENT 49 (The
Johns Hopkins U ni v . Press 2001) , avai lable a t  httpl/muse.jhu.eduijoumals/theory_and_
eventiv005/5.1derridaltml.
111. HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, supra note 104, at 130.
112. NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 86, at 120 (11125).
